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.JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Valley Colour, Inc.'s ("Valley
Colour") appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court's granting of Beuchert Builder, Inc.'s
("Beuchert") Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2b-2(3)(j)
(1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Valley Colour's claims of breach of

contract, repudiation of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as time barred based on the two-year statute of limitations for actions related
to improvements in real property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1995).
Standard of Review: Whether a statute of limitations applies to a particular
cause of action is a question of law, and reviewed for correctness. Klinger v. Kightly. 791
P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Valley Colour's claims of slander of title

and tortious interference as time barred based on the two-year statute of limitations for
actions related to improvements in real property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
(1995).
Standard of Review: Whether a statute of limitations applies to a particular
cause of action is a question of law, and reviewed for correctness. Klinger v. Kightly. 791
P.2d at 869.
3.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Valley Colour's challenge to the

constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 as violative of the Uniform Operation of
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Laws and Private Laws Forbidden sections of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. I,
§ 24 and art. VI, § 26.
Standard of Review: The dismissal of Valley Colour's constitutional chal ige
is a question of law, and reviewed for correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Sa? i^ake
Citv Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Const, art. I, § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Utah Const art. VI, § 26
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be
applicable.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1995)
(3) An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from
the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the date upon which
the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins
to run upon completion or abandonment.
(4) Subject to subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may
be commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement
or abandonment of construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is
discovered in the sixth year of the six year period, the injured person has two additional
years from date of discovery to commence an action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1995)
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Within six years:

(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1995)
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing . . .
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1995)
Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, Nature of the Case;
This is an appeal from Judge Howard Maetani's February 14, 1996
Memorandum Decision granting Beuchert's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss ("Order"). In
that Order, Judge Maetani dismissed all of Valley Colour's claims against Beuchert as time
barred by the two-year statute of limitations for actions related to improvements in real
property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1995).
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
On September 25, 1995, Valley Colour filed a Complaint against Beuchert
alleging the following causes of action: breach of contract; repudiation of contract;
misrepresentation; unjust enrichment; breach of covenant of good faith .and fair dealing;
tortious interference; and slander of title. Complaint ^ 21, 18, 34, 40, 45, 50, and 59.
Valley Colour sought to recover damages it sustained when Beuchert failed to complete a
construction contract for improvements to Valley Colour's real property and to recover for
damages Valley Colour sustained when Beuchert improperly placed a mechanics' lien on the
title to Valley Colour's real property in order to extort more than it was due under the
contract. Valley Colour requested compensatory damages in an amount not less than
$175,000, plus interest and costs.
On December 13, 1995, Beuchert filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
alleging that all of Valley Colour's claims against Beuchert were time barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for actions related to improvements in real property pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5. Valley Colour countered that its claims were not time barred
based on the two-year limitations period under section 78-12-25.5, but instead were governed
by various other statutes of limitations. Additionally, Valley Colour challenged the
constitutionality of section 78-12-25.5 as violative of the Uniform Operation of Laws and
Private Laws Forbidden sections of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, §24 and art.
VI, § 26.
On January 22, 1996, oral argument was held on Beuchert's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss. On February 14, 1996, Judge Maetani entered an Order granting
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Beuchert's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss holding that all of Valley Colour's claims were
time barred by the two-year statute of limitations for actions relating to improvements in real
property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5, and rejecting Valley Colour's challenge
to that statute's constitutionality. Order at 17-18.
On February 27, 1996, Valley Colour noticed its appeal of Judge Maetani's
Order. Valley Colour respectfully asks this Court to overturn Judge Maetani's Order and
allow all of Valley Colour's claims against Beuchert to go forward.
C. Statement of Facts:
On July 20, 1991, Beuchert and Valley Colour entered into an agreement
("Agreement") whereby Beuchert agreed to perform remodeling construction work at a
residential property owned by Valley Colour located at 10415 North, Oak Circle, Highland,
Utah (the "Property"). Complaint at 1 5.
On July 27, 1991, Beuchert commenced the construction work at the Property.
From August of 1991 through December of 1991, Valley Colour made periodic payments to
Beuchert totaling $41,127.85 for construction work that Beuchert represented had been
completed. l i at 1 11. On December 2, 1991, Beuchert abandoned the construction project
although the work was not complete. Subsequent to abandonment, on February 26, 1992
Beuchert placed a mechanics' lien on the Property in the amount of $19,600. IdL at 1 12.
From approximately June of 1992 until around June of 1993, Valley Colour
attempted to sell the Property on an "as is" basis, but was unable to do so. Id,, at 11 15 and
17. In June of 1993, Central Bank foreclosed on the Property. Following the foreclosure, in
October of 1993 Central Bank sold the Property.
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IdL at 1 18.

On September 25, 1995, Valley filed a Complaint with the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the dismissal of which is the subject of
this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First, the trial court erred when it held that the two-year limitations period for
actions related to improvements in real property pursuant to subsection (3) of section 78-1225.5 applied to Valley Colour's contract claims. Instead the correct limitations period is
found either in section 78-12-23 which provides a six-year limitations period for actions
based on an "instrument in writing," or alternatively in subsection (4) of section 78-12-25.5
which provides "no action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced against a
provider more than six years after the completion of the improvement." The language of
section 78-12-25.5 limits its application to actions which result in "injury to persons or
property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(l)(b). In fact, section 78-12-25.5 has historically
always been limited to actions for financial loss, personal injuries or physical damage to
property resulting from defects in design or construction. Section 78-12-25.5 has not been
applied to mere contract actions against builders for defective design or construction.
Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions interpreting their own parallel statutes of limitations
for providers of improvements in real property have limited the "injury to persons or
property" language in their statutes to actions which cause actual physical harm to persons or
property and have allowed contract claims to go forward. Thus, because Valley Colour did
not sustain "injury to persons or property," section 78-12-25.5 does not govern Valley
Colour's contract claims.
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Second, even if this Court were to decide that Valley Colour sustained "injury
to persons or property," the two-year limitations period of 78-12-25.5(3) is still inapplicable
because Valley Colour's contract claims are not actions based on an "act, error, omission, or
breach of duty," but instead are claims based on "breach of contract." Subsection (3)'s twoyear limitations period applies only to an action based on an "act, error, omission, or breach
of duty," whereas subsection (4)'s six-year limitations period applies to an action based on
"breach of contract." The legislature intentionally excluded "breach of contract" claims
from subsection (3)'s two-year limitations period thus indicating that Valley Colour's "breach
of contract" claims are governed by subsection (4)'s six-year limitations period.
Furthermore, the legislative findings contained in the current version of section 78-12-25.5
indicate that the legislature believed that the appropriate limitations period for a claim based
on a written instrument was six years. Section 78-12-25.5(2)(d) states that "the possibility
of injury and damage become highly remote and unexpected as to claims for breach of
contract or warranty six years following completion of the improvement.H Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25.5(2)(d). Thus, clearly the legislature's intent was not to eliminate the six-year
limitations period for written contracts but instead to limit contract actions related to
improvements to real property to six years after completion of the improvement. Therefore,
Valley Colour's claims based on breach of contract are not time barred by the two-year
limitations period of subsection (3), but are timely filed under subsection (4) of section 7812-25.5.
Third, the trial court erred in applying the two-year limitations period for
improvements in real property to Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference
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claims. The slander of title and tortious interference claims are not actions arising from the
Agreement or related to the construction or improvements in real property, but instead are
tort actions arising from Beuchert's unwarranted and malicious filing of the mechanic's ien
against Valley Colour's Property in an attempt to extort more than Beuchert was due. It was
Beuchert's abuse of process by filing the lien against Valley Colour's Property in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 which gave rise to Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious
interference claims, not the Agreement or improvement work that Beuchert failed to perform.
Thus, Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference claims are governed by the
four-year statute of limitations for "relief not otherwise provided for by law" or the threeyear statute of limitations for "injury to real property." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25 and
78-12-26.
Fourth, even if the two-year limitations period for actions related to
improvements in real property applied to the slander of title and tortious interference claims,
the trial court erred in holding that the last event necessary to commence the running of the
statute of limitations was Beuchert's placement of the mechanics' lien on the Property. To
state a claim for slander of title and tortious interference, a claimant must establish "actual
special damages." Valley Colour could not establish such actual or special damages until
October of 1993, when Central Bank sold the Property. Thus, Valley Colour filed its
slander of title and tortious interference claims well within the two-year limitations period.
Lastly, the trial court erred in dismissing Valley Colour's challenge to the
constitutionality of section 78-12-25.5 because the limitations period contained therein
violates the Uniform Operation of Laws and Private Laws Forbidden sections of the Utah

SLCl-23488.1 76196-0001

-8-

Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 24 and art. VI, § 26. Section 78-12-25.5 provides a
stringent two year limitations period for actions "against" a provider but does not provide a
similar limitations period for actions by a provider. Thus, in a contract dispute between a
provider and another party, the provider has the complete protection of the six-year
limitations period for an action based on an instrument in writing whereas the other party's
action against the provider could expire under the two-year limitations period of section 7812-25.5. This is not a uniform operation of the law and thus, violates the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
L

Valley Colour's Contract Claims are Not Based on Conduct That
Caused Injury to Persons or Property, and Thus Are Not Time
Barred bv the Two-Year Limitations Period for Actions Related to
Improvements in Real Property But Instead are Governed bv the
Six-Year Limitations Period For Contract Actions,

Valley Colour's claims of breach of contract, repudiation of contract, unjust
enrichment, and breach of covenant of good faith an fair dealing are not governed by the
two-year limitations period pursuant to subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5 because they are
not based on conduct which caused "injury to persons or property." Instead, Valley
Colour's contract claims are governed by the six-year limitation period pursuant to section
78-12-23, which governs actions based on written contracts.
Section 78-12-25.5 defines an action as "any claim for judicial, arbitral, or
administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty that causes injury to
persons or property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(l)(a) (emphasis added). The trial
court expressly based its Order on its erroneous conclusion that "[a]U of [Valley Colour's]
claims arise out of an injury to property. . . ." Order, at 8.
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Courts in other jurisdictions interpreting statutes of limitations virtually
identical to the current version of section 78-12-25.5 have held that causes of action based on
breach of contract are not within the statute's "injury to persons or property language." In
Securities-Intermountain Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co.. 611 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1980), the
Supreme Court of Oregon stated that "the phrase 'injury to . . . person[s] or to property'
was thought to encompass what is commonly meant by 'personal injuries,' bodily injuries
including their psychic consequences, and physical damage to existing tangible property,
but not to financial losses." IcL (emphasis added). In Securities-Intermountain Inc. a
general contractor brought an action against a subcontractor and architect for defective
installation of a heating system. The subcontractor and architect alleged that the contractor's
claims were time barred by the two-year limitations period for "injuries to person or
property arising from another person performing construction." IcL at 1160. The court
rejected the subcontractor and architect's argument and instead applied the six-year limitation
period for written contracts. The court reasoned that because the contractor sought damages
for the financial injuries resulting from the "faulty performance of a business transaction"
that no injuries to persons or property occurred, and because the parties had privity of
contract, the statute of limitations for written contracts applied. IcL at 1165.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Minnesota limited the "injury to persons or
property" language in their statute of limitations for actions arising from improvements in
real property to "actions in tort by third parties against persons performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction of an improvement to real
estate" and therefore, allowed a county's contract claims against a general contractor,
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subcontractor and architect to go forward. Kittson County v. Wells. Dendbrook & Assocs..
241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1976). The court stated that u[w]hile we have in the past
construed statutes of limitation liberally as embodying important public policy in barring stale
claims, we think a rule of strict construction is more appropriate in the instant case." 14, at
801.1 This Court should limit the "injury to persons or property" language in section 78-1225.5's definition of "action" to claims resulting in bodily injury or physical damage to
property as did the Minnesota and Oregon Supreme Courts, and thus, avoid any
constitutional shortcomings the statute may possess.
This Court, when interpreting the "injury to persons or property" language of
section 78-12-25.5, should also consider the historical interpretation it has given to this same
language which was contained in section 78-12-25.5's predecessor statute. "When
uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and application of a statute, it is appropriate to look
to its purpose in light of its background in history." Mountain States Tele, and Tele, v.
Payne. 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (holding that even though the legislature eliminated
the "intent to defraud" language in a statue establishing liability for any person writing a
check with insufficient funds, in light of the historical application of the statute it could not
apply to a person who wrote the check innocently). In Brigham Young University v. Paulsen
Const. Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting the
predecessor statute to the current version of section 78-12-25.5, indicated that actions based
on contract by owners against contractors were not "injuries] to property" and thus, the six-

1

The court reasoned that the scope of the statute was uncertain and may result in
constitutional violations if read too broadly, thus, to avoid constitutionality issues the court
applied a narrow construction.
SLC1-23488.1
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year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts applied to the university's claim
against the contractor rather than Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1977), section 78-12-25.5's
predecessor statute for actions related to improvements to real property. (Justice Howe
concurring).2 Thus, this Court should consider the historical application of the statute, as it
did in the Brigham Young University and Mountain States cases, and find that the two-year
limitations period for actions which cause injury to persons or property does not apply to
Valley Colour's claims.
The trial court resorted to a variety of canons of statutory construction before
concluding that the two-year limitation period of subsection (3) applied, to Valley Colour's
claims against Beuchert. First, the trial court noted the title of section 78-12-25.5 is
tt

[a]ctions related to improvements in real property." Order at 7. The title of the statute,

however, "is not part of the statute's text" and should be looked to only to determine

2

Section 78-12-25.5 has historically been limited to tort injuries "due to defective
design or construction of improvement to real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
(1977) (emphasis added). Section 78-12-25.5 (1977) did not, however, "apply to actions
founded on contract against builders for defective construction. Such actions are not injury
to property." Brigham Young University. 744 P.2d at 1374-75 (concurring opinion) (holding
the six-year statute of limitations for written contracts applicable rather than the seven-year
statute for actions based on defective design or construction of an improvement in real
property).
In 1991, the Utah legislature amended section 78-12-25.5 because the seven-year
statute violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). The legislative intent of the amended section 78-1225.5 is to provide members of the construction industry relief from potentially infinite
liability and to provide the citizens of Utah a constitutional means of recovery for injuries to
person or property. It was not the legislative intent to abrogate the rights of an individual
who has a cause of action based on a contract. Historically, a claim based on contract was
not within section 78-12-25.5. The "injury to persons or property" restriction contained in
section 78-12-25.5 should be read in light of the historical application of the statute to allow
claims based on a breach of contract.
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legislative intent in the face on an ambiguous statute. Funk v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 839
P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1992).

Thus, reference to the title of the section is of minimal aid in

ascertaining the scope of the statute. Second, the trial court indicated that a statute should be
construed according to its plain language. Order at 8. (citing Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779
P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989).) However, the plain language of section 78-12-25.5 indicates
that subsection (3) applies only to actions which cause "injury to persons or property,"
which, according to Justice Howe in Brigham Young University, does not include contract
actions without any resulting injury to persons or property as here. Finally, the trial court
suggested that the statute should be interpreted as a comprehensive whole rather than [an]
unrelated collection of provisions. Order at 10 (citing Hales Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Audit
Div. of State Tax Comm'n of Utah. 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992)). Looking at the statute as a
whole, including the legislative findings, the statute indicates that ttthe possibility of injury
and damages becomes highly remote and unexpected as to claims for breach of contract or
warranty six years following the completion of the improvement or abandonment." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(2)(d) (emphasis added). Thus, because the statute itself indicates
that claims based on breach of contract do not become remote until six years after
completion, it seems clear that the legislature intended a six-year statute of limitations to
apply to causes of action based on contract where there is no bodily injury or physical
damage to property as here. See Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087, 1091
(Utah 1989).3

3

Another cannon of construction this Court should consider is that a statute should
be construed "to avoid the constitutional infirmities whenever possible." Society of
Separationists. Inc. v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). In order to avoid
SLCl-23488.1 76196-0001

- 13-

Thus, applying the statute's plain language, this Courts historical interpretation
of the statute's terms, other state court interpretations of the their own similar statutes, and
the canons of statutory construction, it is clear that subsection (3)'s two-year limitation
period is applicable only to actions resulting in bodily injury or physical damage to prorerty
(damage other than mere financial loss), and that section 78-12-23's six-year limitation
period for actions based on an instrument in writing is applicable to Valley Colour's contract
claims. Therefore, Valley Colour's contract claims are timely filed.
II.

Valley Colour's Contract Claims Are Not Time Barred bv the TwoYear Limitations Period For a "Breach of Duty" Pursuant to
Subsection (3) of Section 78-12-25,5 But Instead are Governed bv
the Six-Year Limitations Period For "Breach of Contract" Pursuant
to Subsection (4) of Section 78-12-25,5.

Even if Valley Colour suffered "injury to persons or property," Valley
Colour's contract claims are not governed by the two-year limitations period pursuant to
subsection (3), but instead are governed by the six-year limitation period pursuant to
subsection (4) of section 78-12-25.5, which governs actions based on "breach of contract."
Subsection (3) provides that u[a]n action against a provider shall be
commenced within two years from the date of discovery of the act, error, omission or
breach of duty that forms the basis of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(3)
(emphasis added). In contrast, subsection (4) provides, "no action for breach of contract or
warranty may be commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the

constitutional violations through a non-uniform operation of the laws, as addressed in
section V of this brief, this Court should restrict the two-year limitations period in subsection
(3) to bodily injuries or physical damage to property.
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improvement or abandonment of construction." Id. § 78-12-25.5(4). Accordingly, while it
is clear that certain tort type actions, actions based on an "act, error, omission or breach of
duty," must be brought within two years, it is equally clear that actions for "breach of
contract" may be brought within six years after completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. Therefore, because the Utah state legislature has made the
clear distinction between an action based on an "act, error, omission and breach of duty" and
an action based on a "breach of contract," Valley Colour's contract claims are not barred by
the two-year limitations period of subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5.
The trial court, applying the statute's "plain language," held that subsection
(3)'s two year limitations period applied to all of Valley Colour's claims. Order at 8 (citing
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)). However, the plain language of
section 78-12-25.5 indicates that subsection (3) applies only to actions based on an "act,
error, omission, or breach of duty" excluding actions based on a "breach of contract."
Another cannon of statutory construction which the trial court does not include in its
discussion is expressio unis est exclusio alterius, meaning the inclusion of one, excludes the
other. In subsection (3) the legislature references an "act, error, omission, or breach of
duty," but does not reference breach of contract. In contrast, in subsection (4) the legislature
expressly references actions for "breach of contract," indicating its intent to exclude breach
of contract claims from the two-year limitation period set forth in subsection (3).
Lastly, the trial court submits that courts should interpret statutes as to "avoid
making any of their provisions surplusage and meaningless." Order at 10 (quoting Downey
State Bank v. Major-Blakenev Corp.. 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978)). The trial court,

SLCl-23488.1 76196-0001

- 15-

however, goes on and erroneously asserts that if the six-year statute of limitations applicable
to causes of action based on written contracts was read into subsection (4) of section 78-1225.5, that would render subsection (3) a nullity because all injured parties would allege a
breach of contract in order to obtain subsection (4)'s longer limitations period. I(L What the
trial court neglected to acknowledge is that a breach of contract action is not available just
for the asking to all parties injured by a provider of improvements in real property; the
breach of contract allegation must have some merit. The contract claims alleged by Valley
Colour require privity of contract and are not available to all parties who may have other
causes of action against a provider. Thus, for those individuals without privity of contract
with the provider, or otherwise without a valid contract claim, subsection (3)'s two year
limitation period would still govern their claims. Consequently, limiting subsection (3)'s
applicability to breaches of duty and applying subsection (4)'s limitations period to breaches
of contract does not create surplusage or meaningless provisions.
Thus, applying the plain meaning of the statute as a whole and the canons of
statutory construction, it is clear that this Court should construe subsection (3)'s two-year
limitation period as applicable to actions based on an "act, error, omission, or breach of
duty," and subsection (4)'s six-year limitation period as applicable to Valley Colour's claims
for "breach of contract." Therefore, Valley Colour's contract claims are timely filed.
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HI.

Valley Colour's Slander of Title and Tortious Interference Claims
Do Not Arise Out Of or Relate To Improvements in Real Property,
and Thus Are Not Timed Barred by the Two-Year Limitations
Period for Actions Related to Improvements in Real Property But
Instead are Timely Filed Under the Three-Year Limitations Period
for Tortious Injury to Real Property or the Four-Year Limitations
Period for Actions for Relief Not Otherwise Provided for bv Law.

Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference claims are not time
barred by the two-year limitations period for actions related to improvements in real
property, but instead are governed by the three-year limitations period for tortious "injury to
real property" pursuant to section 78-12-26 or the four-year limitations period for "relief not
otherwise provided for by law" pursuant to section 78-12-25(3).
The trial court expressly based its decision that the two-year limitations period
under subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5 was applicable on its erroneous conclusion that
tt

[a]U of [Valley Colour's] claims arise from the agreement made between Valley Colour and

Beuchert Builders for remodeling work." Order, at 8. Slander of title and tortious
interference are not claims arising from the performance of remodeling work, or the
remodeling agreement itself; rather, they are torts which arise from Beuchert's unwarranted
and abusive placement of the mechanics lien on Valley Colour's title to the Property.
Beuchert placed the lien on the title in an attempt to exact from Valley Colour an amount in
excess of the value of the materials and labor it had contributed to the Property, with the
intent to cloud Valley Colour's title and interfere with Valley Colour's ability to sell the
Property. Any person filing a lien against property with the intent to extort more than is due
or to gain any unwarranted advantage or benefit is guilty of a misdemeanor. Utah Code
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Ann. § 38-1-25 (1995). It was Beuchert's abuse of process that gave rise to the slander of
title and tortious interference claims, not the remodeling work or the remodeling Agreement.
Courts distinguish between actions relating to contracts and those relating to
subsequent tortious behavior. For example, in Greenwood v. Sherfield the court held that a
retailer's tortious interference with the contractual relations of one of its; merchants was not
tt

[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] agreement" between the

retailer and the merchant. 895 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
The retailer in Greenwood allegedly told potential purchasers of the merchant's business that
there would be substantial changes to the contract the retailer had entered into with the
merchant, thus causing the potential purchasers to terminate the sale. The Greenwood court
found that the retailer's tortious interference did not arise out of or relate to the contract
because the alleged tortious conduct did not arise out of a dispute involving interpretation of
the contract terms.
The basis for Beuchert's assertion that Valley Colour's claims arose out of or
are related to the remodeling Agreement is that absent the Agreement contract between
Valley Colour and Beuchert there would be nothing for Beuchert to allegedly interfere with,
and thus no claim for slander of title or tortious interference. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss at 4. The courts have flatly rejected this oversimplified reasoning. It is not
sufficient that the dispute would not have arisen absent the existence of the contract to qualify
as a dispute that arises out of or relates to the contract in question. Armada Coal Export.
Inc. v. Interbulk. Ltd. 726 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1984). In Armada Coal, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to find that a charterer's tort claims against a vessel owner based on wrongful
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attachment of the charterer's coal and for conversion of the charterer's letter of credit arose
out of or were related to the charter contract. The court recognized that "certainly there is a
connection between the claims and the charter" and that "but for the two parties having
entered into the business arrangement" the claims would not exist. 726 F.2d at 11568.
However, the court went on to hold that this connection is "not sufficiently close" to
constitute a dispute arising out of the charter agreement. IcL Likewise, the mere fact that
Valley Colour's claims, like the charterer's claims in Armada Coal, would not exist absent
the Agreement, is inadequate to force Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious
interference claims into the limitations period for "[ajctions related to improvements in real
property."
In order to state a claim based on slander of title, Valley Colour must show
that Beuchert's lien "caused actual or special damages." First Sec. Bank v. Banberry
Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989); Gillmor v. Cummings 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995). Since the statute of limitations does not begin to run until "the happening of
the last event necessary to . . . the cause of action" the statute of limitations period did not
begin to run until Valley Colour ultimately incurred actual damages resulting from the
imposition of the lien. Becton v. Reese. 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1993). Thus, the event
necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations was the event that inflicted actual
damages upon Valley Colour, which was when Central Bank sold the Property following the
foreclosure. That event did not occur until October of 1993, well within the three-year
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limitations period for actions arising from tortious injury to property and the four-year
limitations period for relief not otherwise provided for by law.4
As with slander of title, in order to establish a claim for tortious interference a
claimant must show "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means,
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293,
304 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added) (recognizing the tort of interference with economic
relations). Valley Colour's tortious interference claim arises from the interference that
Beuchert's lien created with respect to Valley Colour's inability to sell the Property after
Central Bank sold the Property in October of 1993 following the foreclosure.5 Thus, one of
the essential events that establishes a cause of action for tortious interference clearly occurred
well within both the three-year limitations period set forth in section 78-12-26 and the fouryear limitations period set forth in section 78-12-25.

4

Even if the last event necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations is
deemed to be Valley Colour's inability to sell the Property "as is," which occurred in June
of 1993, Valley Colour's slander of title claim is still well within the three-year limitations
period for actions arising from tortious injury to property and the four-year limitations period
for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
5

Even if the last event necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations is
deemed to be Valley Colour's inability to sell the Property "as is," which occurred in June
of 1993, Valley Colour's tortious interference claim is still well within the three-year
limitations period for actions arising from tortious injury to property and the four-year
limitations period for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
SLCl-23488.1 76196-0001

-20-

IV.

Valley Colour's Slander of Title and Tortious Interference Claims
Were Timely Filed Even Within the Two-Year Limitations Period
for Actions Relating to Improvements in Real Property Because the
Last Event Necessary to the Causes of Action, a Specific Realized
or Liquidated Monetary Loss. Did Not Occur Until Central Bank
Sold the Property.

Even if the two-year limitations period in subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5
were to apply to Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference claims, Valley
Colour filed its claims within that two-year period because the two-year period did not start
to run until Central Bank sold the Property in October of 1993 after the foreclosure.
To state a claim based on slander of title a claimant must show that the act in
question "caused actual or special damages." First Sec. Bank, 780 P.2d at 1257. Since
"[t]he general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon "the happening of the last event
necessary to . . . the cause of action" Valley Colour's slander of title claim did not begin to
accrue until Beuchert's wrongfully placed lien inflicted or resulted in actual or special
damages. Brigham Young University. 744 P.2d at 1373.
Actual or special damages are proved in a slander of title action by evidence
of the loss of some "pecuniary advantage." Bass v. Planned Management Servs.. 761 P.2d
566, 568 (Utah 1988). "There are no general or presumed damages in slander of title
actions. . . .

Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the

saleableness or use of the Property, there is no damage." Id. (emphasis added). "The
special damages rule requires the plaintiff to establish pecuniary loss that has been realized
or liquidated as in the case of specific lost sales." First Sec. Bank. 780 P.2d at 1257
(quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, at 971 (5th ed. 1984)).
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Therefore, before Valley Colour's slander of title claim can begin to accrue, a specific
realized or liquidated monetary loss had to have first occurred.
Likewise, in an action for tortious interference "proof of some damages is
necessary to sustain the action." W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts. § 129
(5th ed. 1984). For example, in Stoller Fisheries. Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co.. 258
N.W.2d 336, 339-41 (Iowa 1977) the court held that the statute of limitations for tortious
interference did not begin to run until the alleged interference caused an actual injury, L ^
until an actual judgment was entered against the party alleging interference. RL at 339-41.
The Stoller court concluded that in its view "the mere possibility, or even probability, that an
event causing damages will result from the mere breach of . . . duty not to intentionally or
improperly interfere with [the plaintiffs] prospective economic advantage . . . does not
render the [defendant's] alleged wrongful act actionable." 14. at 341.
Consequently, Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference claims
did not mature until Valley Colour suffered a specific realized or liquidated monetary loss,
which occurred as a result of Valley Colour's inability to sell the Property after Central Bank
sold it in October of 1993 following foreclosure. Because this event was well within the
two-year limitations period of subsection (3) of 78-12-25.5, Valley Colour's slander of title
and tortious interference claims were timely filed.
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V.

The Two-Year Limitations Period for Actions Relating to
Improvements in Real Property is Unconstitutional Because it
Violates the Uniform Operation of Laws and Private Laws
Forbidden Sections of the Utah Constitution.

Even if the trial court's interpretation of the various statutes of limitations
were correct, the two-year limitations period in section 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional because
it violates the Uniform Operation of Laws and the Private Laws Forbidden sections of the
Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 24 and art. VI, § 26.
The Uniform Operation of Laws section of the Utah Constitution provides that,
u

[a]U laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.'1 Utah Const, art. I, § 24.

Section 78-12-25.5 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for actions "against a
provider" but not for actions by a provider. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(3) (emphasis
added). A provider can bring an action within three, four or six-years under sections
78-12-23, 78-12-25 and 78-12-26, but an injured party must bring his action against a
provider within two years. Because this is not a uniform operation of a law, it violates Utah
Const, art. I, § 24.6

6

In addition, the Private Laws Forbidden section of the Utah Constitution states,
[n]o private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be applicable." Utah
Const, art VI, § 26. Section 78-12-25.5 is a law which provides a special and unfair
advantage to providers in the construction industry by allowing an extended period in which
to bring actions while limiting actions against such providers. As such, section 78-12-25.5
violates the Private Laws Forbidden section of the Utah Constitution.
In essence, the Uniform Operation of Law and Private Laws Forbidden sections of the
Utah Constitution are the "flip side" of each other. Thus, ttif a law satisfies the requirement
of article I, section 24, that 'all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation,' it
will not violate article VI, section 26 (Private Laws Forbidden)." Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 645 (Utah 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a
tax on health service corporations). Therefore, analysis need only proceed under the
Uniform Operation of Law section.
a
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To determine whether a statute violates the Uniform Operation of Law
provision the Court must consider whether the purported discriminatory classification is a
reasonable one. Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs.. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)
(upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the introduction of seat belt use as
evidence of contributory negligence). A discriminatory classification such as that in section
78-12-25.5, which provides for different limitations periods for parties to the same contract
is unreasonable. The Utah Supreme Court, in Lee v. Gaufin. stated, "[a] law does not operate
uniformly if persons similarly situated are not treated similarly." Lee, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah
1993). In Lee the Court addressed the constitutionality of a combination statute of limitations /
statute of repose for malpractice actions brought on behalf of minors. The Court held that the
statute contained an unreasonable classification and was thus, unconstitutional for the following
two reasons: first, despite the historical exemption of minorsfromlimitations periods and the
fundamental differences between adults and minors, the limitations period in the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act treated adults and minors identically by providing the same limitations
period within which both minors and adults must bring medical malpractice action; second,
the Court indicated that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act discriminated between minors
injured by medical malpractice and minors injured by all other types of negligence by failing
to recognize a minor's incapacity to bring suit in medical malpractice actions and
recognizing a minor's incapacity to bring suit in all other types of actions. Thus, the Court
found that the classification was unreasonable.
Section 78-12-25.5 contains a similarly irrational classification between parties
to the same contract. In all other areas of the law, both parties to a written contract have the
SLCl-23488.1 76196-0001
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same six-year statute of limitations period in which to bring their claims in the event of a
breach. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Conversely, if this Court adopts the trial court's
interpretation of section 78-12-25.5, where the contract in question relates to an
improvement in real property the provider of the improvement still has six years within
which to bring its action, but the non-provider party must bring its action within two years.
Thus, like the minors in LSS, the non-provider party in a suit against a provider is
irrationally treated different than the provider. If a contract claim relating to improvements
in real property becomes stale within two years for the non-provider party, that claim is
equally stale from the provider's perspective.

A law which provides different limitation

periods to the two parties of the same contract is an irrational classification that deprives the
non-provider party of its constitutional right to access the Utah courts under the Open Courts
provision of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court stated that the "legislature has stated its reasons for classifying
the group differently and set out its purposes in § 78-12-25.5(2)." Order at 16. Although
the legislature did state its reasons for classifying *actions related to improvements in real
property" differently than actions unrelated to such improvements, the legislature failed to
state any reasons for classifying claims "against" providers in such actions differently than
claims "by" providers in such actions.
Therefore, this Court should not adopt the trial court's interpretation of section
78-12-25.5, but instead, should find that section 78-12-25.5 unreasonably treats similarly
situated persons (the two parties to the same contract) dissimilarly, and is unconstitutional as
violative of the Uniform Operation of Law provision.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in applying the two-year limitations period in subsection
(3) of 78-12-25.5 to Valley Colour's contract claims because those claims did not cause
"injury to persons or property." This Court should find that the claims are instead governed
by the six-year limitations period for actions based on an instrument in writing as set forth in
section 78-12-23. Alternatively, this Court should find that Valley Colour's contract claims
are governed by the six-year limitation period for "breach of contract" in subsection (4) of
78-12-25.5 rather than they two-year limitation period for "breach of duty" in subsection (3)
of 78-12-25.5.
Additionally, the trial court erred in applying the two-year limitations period
in subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5 for actions relating to improvements in real property
to Valley Colour's slander of title and tortious interference claims. Those claims do not
arise out of the improvement Agreement or relate to improvements in real property, rather
they arise out of Beuchert's unwarranted and wrongful placement of a mechanics lien on the
title to Valley Colour's Property and are thus governed by the three-year limitations period
for tortious injury to real property in section 78-12-26 or the four-year limitations period for
relief not otherwise provided for by law in section 78-12-25. Even if the two-year
limitations period in subsection (3) of section 78-12-25.5 were to apply to Valley Colour's
slander of title and tortious interference claims, those claims did not accrue until Central
Bank sold the Property after foreclosure, well within the two-year limitations period.
Lastly, the trial court erred in dismissing Valley Colour's challenge to the
constitutionality of section 78-12-25.5. The statute's preferential treatment for providers of
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improvements to real property is violative of the Uniform Operation of Law and Private
Laws Forbidden sections of the Utah Constitution.
For all of the foregoing reasons this Court should overrule the trial court's
dismissal of Valley Colour's complaint and permit all of Valley Colour's claims to go
forward.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J 2 S day of July, 1996.

Martin Banks
STOEL RIVES LLP

^ ^

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
Valley Colour, Inc.
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23.

Within six years — Mesne profits of real property —
Instrument in writing — Distribution of criminal
proceeds to victim.

Within six years:
(1)
An action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2)
An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
(3)
An July 26, 1996 action instituted under Section 78-11-12.5 regarding
distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim.
1984
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.
Within four years.
Within four years:
(1)
An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for
any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or services
rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is
received.
(2)
A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25,
Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a)
Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for
action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b)
Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c)
Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3)
An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
1988
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5.
Actions related to improvements in real property.
(1)
As used in this section:
(a)
"action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief
for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty that causes injury to persons or
property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity,
contribution, or other source of law;
(b)
"completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion
of an improvement to real property as established by a Certificate of Substantial
Completion, a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency, or the date of
first use or possession of the improvement, whichever is earliest;
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(c)
"improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road,
utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real
property;
(d)
"person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture
association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity; and
(e)
"provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or pe orrr g
studies, plans, specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or c int
estimates, topographic surveys, staking, construction, and the review, obser dor
administration, management, supervision, inspections, and tests of construe .on for or
in relation to an improvement.
(2)
The Legislature finds that:
(a)
exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or
breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and
unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b)
these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records
storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and
an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many years after
completion of an improvement;
(c)
these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d)
the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and
unexpected as to claims for breach of contract or warranty six years following
completion of the improvement or the abandonment of construction and, as to all
other claims, ten years following completion or abandonment;
(e)
it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the
periods of repose provided in this chapter; and
(f)
it is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to impose a period
of limitation requiring that an action against a provider be brought within a two-year
period following discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty that forms
the basis of the action.
(3)
An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the
date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date upon which the
act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two year period begins
to run upon completion or abandonment.
(4)
Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may be
commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is
discovered in the sixth year of the six year period, the injured person has two additional
years from the date of discovery to commence an action.
(5)
Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), no action may be commenced against a
provider more than 12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the
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twelfth year of the 12-year period, the injured person shall have two additional years from
the date of discovery to commence an action.
(6)
Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply to an action against a provider:
(a)
who has fraudulently concealed the act, error, omission, or breach of
duty;
(b)
for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(c)
for breach of a written express warranty where the warranty period
extends beyond six years as provided in Subsection (4).
(7)
If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action
within the periods prescribed by Subsections (4) and (5) solely because that person was a
minor or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years
from the date the disability is removed to commence the action.
(8)
The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action
against any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately
causes the injury for which the action is brought.
(9)
This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable contract.
(10) This section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after
April 29, 1991, notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty occurred, or
the improvement was completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991.
1991
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26.
Within three years.
Within three years:
(1)
An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining
claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2)
An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including
actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of the action
is a domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time of its loss
has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner
without the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by
the defendant.
(3)
An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4)
An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different
limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
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(5)
An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the
cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably shot knc
of the harm suffered.
86

SLC1-23488.1 76196-0001

-4-

